Dress matters
Dress matters Salbiah AhmadNov 24, 05 12:21pm
A friend from the United States sent me a report from a Singapore newspaper on Michelle Leslie’s first shopping day in Singapore, inviting comment. Ms Leslie survived jail in Bali when she was acquitted of drug charges.
Salbiah Ahmad
SALBIAH AHMAD is a lawyer and an independent researcher. MALAYA! as the name for this column was inspired by the meaning of 'Malaya' in Tagalog which means freedom. The events at the end of 1998 in KL offer a new inspiration. MALAYA! takes on the process of reclaiming the many facets of independence.
MalaysiakiniThe report read that “it was unclear whether she presented herself as a Muslim as part of her legal strategy, her Australian lawyer Ross Hill has said that they had played the cards they were dealt”. She had a “sudden makeover” in Singapore where she traded for her headscarf for “skinny jeans, midriff-baring tank top and designer shades”. I am reminded of the example of the wearing of the fez for males in the Ottoman empire over the hat (the brim of which impedes prostration during prayer). The fez introduced by Mahmud II overtook the hat which overtook the turban in a dress revolution (1826-1829) which was a part of modernization. The way the fez was worn, whether sideways, over the forehead or on the back of the head, could indicate wealth or morals. Local Christians and Jews and foreigners working in the region wore the fez when they wanted to show respect for, deflect the hostility of, the Muslims. Ms Leslie, like the fez wearers of old, merely did what she perceived was best in the circumstances. The importance attached to dress is well documented in Philip Mansel’s, Dressed to Rule. It is not the preoccupation solely of the Ottoman-Muslims. Mansel notes the incidences where the Muslim dress was adopted by others in Europe like “rebellious Serbs” while planning insurrection against Ottoman governments. There was a fixed dress code since the Muslim conquests of the 7th century of dress between Muslims and minority non-Muslims. The latter were forbidden to wear garments equal to or resembling Muslims as a sign of “official protection and a means of controlling the group”. Religious identity replaced class and fashion. Political dress Sultans and their entourage wore imperial costumes, much against the injunctions of the religion, as they are made of velvet, satin, brocades of silk and gold and from the 18th century of sable and fur. Ottoman ceremonial dress functioned as political weapons. Robes of honor were awarded by Sultans as symbolic expressions of patronage, protection and sovereignty, to honour and assert control over the recipient. The Emperor of Japan began imposing Western dress for his subjects in 1870. His doctor advised him to allow women to retain the kimono as a healthier alternative to corsets of the day. The Emperor replied, ‘Doctor, about matters of health you may know a great deal. About politics you know nothing.’ In Moghul India, the Emperor might take off his own ceremonial garment (the khilat, a variation of the Ottoman kaftan) and bestow it on a subject. In 1666, the Hindu leader, Shivaji was recorded to have shown his rejection of Moghul rule by throwing his khilat on the ground before Aurengzeb (1658-1707) saying, ‘Kill me, imprison me if you like, but I will not wear the khilat.’ Rebellion was shown in other forms. Gandhi and Edward VIII were two historical figures who dressed for rebellion. Gandhi’s loincloths defeated British uniforms. On his accession, Edward VIII abolished the frock coat for wear at Court and was often seen without a hat. At the 13th Malaysian Law Conference in Kuala Lumpur last week, my former law students from IIUM exclaimed that they did not know that my teaching contract was not renewed for my allegedly unislamic dress. One of them, now a law teacher there said that the then offending rector, Abu Sulayman (a Saudi) has a daughter who did not observe the wearing of the headscarf. I remember that brimstone and hell-fire being the rationale used for women’s Muslim dress in IIUM. I have observed that the covering of women continues to be Muslim exotica in the press, much like polygamy. The coverage is usually sensational, mostly about what Islam says. What Islam says is always mediated by humans and is mostly gendered. 'Tudong-type'One of the reasons for me to leave and continue to be unaffiliated to the local group, Sisters in Islam in 1997, a group I formed in 1987, was the headscarf. I had negotiated the wearing of the headscarf in ways I am comfortable with even after IIUM, and it has nothing to do with IIUM’s Muslim dress code stipulations. In a first meeting with the Ford Foundation’s representative, one of the members of Sisters took my scarf off me. She does not want a group member to be perceived by a funder as a “tudong type”, unprogressive, even ‘fundamentalist-obsurantist’. I was humiliated by her action and told her the same in the meeting. She was unrepentant. I think at that moment she was much like the powers that-be in IIUM, coercive. There was scant respect for choice. By that act of ‘uncovering’ me, she showed her failure to understand that the headscarf for Muslim women may be political for some, religious for some others, fashion for some, and whatever else for that matter. It is important to appreciate that not all women share the same reasons for a choice, be it dress or even polygamy. Agency, a matter feminist theory continues to locate as important, is often overlooked by activists. Furthermore, it is crucial that we should always support and respect all the spaces that women have found empowering. It is not us women against them women, the “tudong types” in the case of dress. Dress for Muslim women remain a complicated matter but should not be problematic. In reading out patriarchal interpretations from the Quran, Asma Barlas (2002), say that conservatives justify ‘veiling’ (from hijab to the burqa) on the grounds that women’s bodies are “pudendal, hence sexually corrupting to those who see them”. Such gendered interpretations continue to be sacralised and be universalized when the Quran intended the verses to be specific. The notion of universals and specifics constitute exegetical methodology. Read with Q 2:256 on no compulsion in religion, the purpose of the first set of verses on jilbab (cloak) and khumur (shawl) were not meant to hide Muslim women but “to render them visible, hence recognizable” as a way to protect women. This recognition-protection mode took its meaning from the social-structure of a slave-owning society in which sexual abuse, especially of slaves were rampant. Religious identities In such societies, the law of the veil distinguished “which women were under male protection and which were fair game.” Even though worn by women, the jilbab served as a “marker of Jahili male sexual promiscuity and abuse at a time when women had no legal recourse and had to rely on themselves for their own protection”. Barlas propose that a society that is serious in eradicating sexual and gender based violence against women, should opt for inter alia sexual harassment laws instead of making veiling, women’s defense against abuse. In my view, the argument of any type of veiling as a cultural icon should not be imposed on any person, even as uniform, especially in an institution of high learning where values of agency, integrity, freedom and democracy require inculcation. In a study of Muslim religious identity among Muslim youth after September 11 in the United Sates, Lori Peek (2005), states that religious identity emerges in social and historical context and demonstrates that its development is variable rather than static. She discusses religion as an ascribed identity (no reflection), religion as a chosen identity and religion as a declared identity. A religious identity often obscures other identity such as ethnicity and nationality. The ‘Muslim dress’ today is powerful because of a personal identity and collective association. It reflects the importance of religion as a basis of personal and sacred identity. Identity is in any case always constructed, negotiated, maintained and enacted to reconcile multiple, sometimes conflicting forms of identity. References: Philip Mansel (2005), Dressed to Rule: Royal and Court Costume from Louis XIV to Elizabeth II ( New Haven, London: Yale University Press) Asma Barlas (2002), Believing Women in Islam: Unreading Patriarchal Interpretations of the Quran (Austin, Texas: University of Texas Press) Lori Peek (2005), “Becoming Muslim”, Sociology of Religion. Vol 66. No.3 Fall 2005, 215-242
A friend from the United States sent me a report from a Singapore newspaper on Michelle Leslie’s first shopping day in Singapore, inviting comment. Ms Leslie survived jail in Bali when she was acquitted of drug charges.
Salbiah Ahmad
SALBIAH AHMAD is a lawyer and an independent researcher. MALAYA! as the name for this column was inspired by the meaning of 'Malaya' in Tagalog which means freedom. The events at the end of 1998 in KL offer a new inspiration. MALAYA! takes on the process of reclaiming the many facets of independence.
MalaysiakiniThe report read that “it was unclear whether she presented herself as a Muslim as part of her legal strategy, her Australian lawyer Ross Hill has said that they had played the cards they were dealt”. She had a “sudden makeover” in Singapore where she traded for her headscarf for “skinny jeans, midriff-baring tank top and designer shades”. I am reminded of the example of the wearing of the fez for males in the Ottoman empire over the hat (the brim of which impedes prostration during prayer). The fez introduced by Mahmud II overtook the hat which overtook the turban in a dress revolution (1826-1829) which was a part of modernization. The way the fez was worn, whether sideways, over the forehead or on the back of the head, could indicate wealth or morals. Local Christians and Jews and foreigners working in the region wore the fez when they wanted to show respect for, deflect the hostility of, the Muslims. Ms Leslie, like the fez wearers of old, merely did what she perceived was best in the circumstances. The importance attached to dress is well documented in Philip Mansel’s, Dressed to Rule. It is not the preoccupation solely of the Ottoman-Muslims. Mansel notes the incidences where the Muslim dress was adopted by others in Europe like “rebellious Serbs” while planning insurrection against Ottoman governments. There was a fixed dress code since the Muslim conquests of the 7th century of dress between Muslims and minority non-Muslims. The latter were forbidden to wear garments equal to or resembling Muslims as a sign of “official protection and a means of controlling the group”. Religious identity replaced class and fashion. Political dress Sultans and their entourage wore imperial costumes, much against the injunctions of the religion, as they are made of velvet, satin, brocades of silk and gold and from the 18th century of sable and fur. Ottoman ceremonial dress functioned as political weapons. Robes of honor were awarded by Sultans as symbolic expressions of patronage, protection and sovereignty, to honour and assert control over the recipient. The Emperor of Japan began imposing Western dress for his subjects in 1870. His doctor advised him to allow women to retain the kimono as a healthier alternative to corsets of the day. The Emperor replied, ‘Doctor, about matters of health you may know a great deal. About politics you know nothing.’ In Moghul India, the Emperor might take off his own ceremonial garment (the khilat, a variation of the Ottoman kaftan) and bestow it on a subject. In 1666, the Hindu leader, Shivaji was recorded to have shown his rejection of Moghul rule by throwing his khilat on the ground before Aurengzeb (1658-1707) saying, ‘Kill me, imprison me if you like, but I will not wear the khilat.’ Rebellion was shown in other forms. Gandhi and Edward VIII were two historical figures who dressed for rebellion. Gandhi’s loincloths defeated British uniforms. On his accession, Edward VIII abolished the frock coat for wear at Court and was often seen without a hat. At the 13th Malaysian Law Conference in Kuala Lumpur last week, my former law students from IIUM exclaimed that they did not know that my teaching contract was not renewed for my allegedly unislamic dress. One of them, now a law teacher there said that the then offending rector, Abu Sulayman (a Saudi) has a daughter who did not observe the wearing of the headscarf. I remember that brimstone and hell-fire being the rationale used for women’s Muslim dress in IIUM. I have observed that the covering of women continues to be Muslim exotica in the press, much like polygamy. The coverage is usually sensational, mostly about what Islam says. What Islam says is always mediated by humans and is mostly gendered. 'Tudong-type'One of the reasons for me to leave and continue to be unaffiliated to the local group, Sisters in Islam in 1997, a group I formed in 1987, was the headscarf. I had negotiated the wearing of the headscarf in ways I am comfortable with even after IIUM, and it has nothing to do with IIUM’s Muslim dress code stipulations. In a first meeting with the Ford Foundation’s representative, one of the members of Sisters took my scarf off me. She does not want a group member to be perceived by a funder as a “tudong type”, unprogressive, even ‘fundamentalist-obsurantist’. I was humiliated by her action and told her the same in the meeting. She was unrepentant. I think at that moment she was much like the powers that-be in IIUM, coercive. There was scant respect for choice. By that act of ‘uncovering’ me, she showed her failure to understand that the headscarf for Muslim women may be political for some, religious for some others, fashion for some, and whatever else for that matter. It is important to appreciate that not all women share the same reasons for a choice, be it dress or even polygamy. Agency, a matter feminist theory continues to locate as important, is often overlooked by activists. Furthermore, it is crucial that we should always support and respect all the spaces that women have found empowering. It is not us women against them women, the “tudong types” in the case of dress. Dress for Muslim women remain a complicated matter but should not be problematic. In reading out patriarchal interpretations from the Quran, Asma Barlas (2002), say that conservatives justify ‘veiling’ (from hijab to the burqa) on the grounds that women’s bodies are “pudendal, hence sexually corrupting to those who see them”. Such gendered interpretations continue to be sacralised and be universalized when the Quran intended the verses to be specific. The notion of universals and specifics constitute exegetical methodology. Read with Q 2:256 on no compulsion in religion, the purpose of the first set of verses on jilbab (cloak) and khumur (shawl) were not meant to hide Muslim women but “to render them visible, hence recognizable” as a way to protect women. This recognition-protection mode took its meaning from the social-structure of a slave-owning society in which sexual abuse, especially of slaves were rampant. Religious identities In such societies, the law of the veil distinguished “which women were under male protection and which were fair game.” Even though worn by women, the jilbab served as a “marker of Jahili male sexual promiscuity and abuse at a time when women had no legal recourse and had to rely on themselves for their own protection”. Barlas propose that a society that is serious in eradicating sexual and gender based violence against women, should opt for inter alia sexual harassment laws instead of making veiling, women’s defense against abuse. In my view, the argument of any type of veiling as a cultural icon should not be imposed on any person, even as uniform, especially in an institution of high learning where values of agency, integrity, freedom and democracy require inculcation. In a study of Muslim religious identity among Muslim youth after September 11 in the United Sates, Lori Peek (2005), states that religious identity emerges in social and historical context and demonstrates that its development is variable rather than static. She discusses religion as an ascribed identity (no reflection), religion as a chosen identity and religion as a declared identity. A religious identity often obscures other identity such as ethnicity and nationality. The ‘Muslim dress’ today is powerful because of a personal identity and collective association. It reflects the importance of religion as a basis of personal and sacred identity. Identity is in any case always constructed, negotiated, maintained and enacted to reconcile multiple, sometimes conflicting forms of identity. References: Philip Mansel (2005), Dressed to Rule: Royal and Court Costume from Louis XIV to Elizabeth II ( New Haven, London: Yale University Press) Asma Barlas (2002), Believing Women in Islam: Unreading Patriarchal Interpretations of the Quran (Austin, Texas: University of Texas Press) Lori Peek (2005), “Becoming Muslim”, Sociology of Religion. Vol 66. No.3 Fall 2005, 215-242
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